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Summary: Jefferson and Madison dispatch Commodore James Barron with five frigates to the Mediterranean, and by this letter, encourage special envoy James Cathcart to remain with the squadron and to pursue any diplomatic opening that might arise during hostilities with the Barbary Pirates. “Commodore Barron … is proceeding to the Mediterranean with five additional frigates … Enclosed … is a copy of the Act of Congress for raising a revenue and making appropriations for defraying the expense of the war with Tripoli.” James Madison. Letter Signed as Secretary of State, to James L. Cathcart. Department of State [Washington], June 11, 1804. 2 pp., with integral address leaf. Inventory# 20998 $7,500 Complete Transcript: Department of State June 11 th 1804 Sir The latest letters I have received from you are those of the 10, 21, & 27 March. I had before received several copies of your accounts which are now in the Treasury Department in a course of investigation and settlement. By Commodore Barron who is proceeding to the Mediterranean with five additional frigates _____ of which is armed en flute, I take occasion to mention, that if after receiving my last letter, which permitted your return to the United States, as soon as your convenience might require, you should have continued with Commodore Preble's Squadron, your conduct is approved by the President; but after the arrival of the new Commodore, as there will be several gentlemen under his command, who have some acquaintance with Barbary affairs, and there will be less inducement to the abandonment of your wishes, your stay in the Mediterranean will recur to the footing pointed out in my letter above referred to. Enclosed [not included] is a copy of the Act of Congress for raising a revenue and making appropriations for defraying the expense of the war with Tripoli. I am very respectfully Sir Your Obdedt. Servt. James Madison Department of State Of the U.S. of America James L. Cathcart Esq. To the Care of Commodore Barron Malta Forwarded by Yr Obdt. Servant Mr. Higgins From Mr. Madison Of June the 11 th 1804 Recd October 15 th at Leghorn Historical Background:
President Jefferson and Secretary of State Madison faced an immediate crisis in the Mediterranean upon assuming office in 1801. James Cathcart had been special envoy to Tripoli for several years under President Adams. In 1801, Yusuf Karamanli—the Pasha of Tripoli—demanded $225,000 tribute from Catchart up front and $25,000 annually. Through Cathcart, Jefferson expressed his desire for a permanent change in policy away from tributes and toward military intervention if Tripoli continued to prey on American commercial vessels. He reacted with righteous anger at Bashaw’s ultimatum. “I know that nothing will stop the eternal increase from these pirates but the presence of an armed force.” Despite his previous opposition to the creation of a permanent navy, Jefferson dispatched a squadron to Tripoli, reasoning that this step would be cheaper than fulfilling the exorbitant tribute demands. Madison instructed Catchart “to stifle every pretension … that the United States will … make the smallest contribution to [the bashaw] as the price of peace.” Jefferson did not ask Congress for a declaration of war, however. Despite Jefferson’s public letter to the Bashaw offering “assurances of friendship,” and insisting that the U.S. force was only a “squadron of observation,” Tripoli declared war on the U.S. later in 1801. Commodore Richard Dale’s squadron achieved an early victory when Lieutenant Andrew Sterrett and his Enterprise destroyed the pirate ship Tripoli. Because of the absence of a formal Congressional declaration of war, Sterrett did not take the Tripoli as a prize, instead throwing its guns overboard and allowing the combatants to go free. The U.S. did follow up on the victory by establishing a blockade, but neither Dale nor his successors—Commodores Richard Morris and Edward Preble—succeeded in completely closing Tripoli off from the outside world. Jefferson soon became embroiled in a political crisis with fiscal conservatives in his own party over the rising costs of the war with Tripoli. At a heated cabinet meeting, Jefferson asked, “Shall we buy peace of Tripoli?” According to historian Frank Lambert, they were unanimous in voting yes, but two assented qualifiedly: “[Albert] Gallatin, [Henry] Dearborn, and [Levi] Lincoln thought the United States should pay both a gross sum up front and an annual tribute and secure a peace treaty immediately. Madison and [Robert] Smith objected to paying tribute, though they thought it would be necessary to promise the renewal of presents from time to time.” Jefferson decided to try the carrot and stick approach: Cathcart was empowered to offer tribute by way of a peace treaty, but Preble was ordered to establish a tighter blockade of Tripoli harbor by using smaller, faster gunboats. But a new crisis commenced before the new gunboats arrived. In Otober 1803, the U.S.S. Philadelphia ran aground while on blockade patrol. After a brief action, a Tripolitan naval force took the Philadelphia, imprisoned Captain William Bainbridge and his crew, and turned its guns against the other American ships. Lieutenant Stephen Decatur became the first genuine American hero since the Revolutionary War when, in command of a small force of marines, he assaulted and torched the Philadelphia on February 16, 1804. While the Philadelphia crewmen still languished in Tripolitan prisons, Jefferson and Madison encouraged Preble, and then Commodore Samuel Barron, to escalate their attacks. In fact, while Barron was on his way to reinforce the American squadron in the Mediterranean, with this letter to Cathcart, Commodore Preble was hammering the enemy fleet and harbor fortifications in Tripoli. The breakthrough came on land, however. Barron was given separate instructions to empower ex-army captain William Eaton to lead a force of U.S. Marines and Arab and Greek mercenaries to operate in the North African interior and encourage opposition to the reigning Pasha within Tripoli. Eaton’s force surprised the city of Derna from the rear, an event memorialized in the Marine hymn, “To the Shores of Tripoli.” Diplomat Tobias Lear finally hammered out a treaty with Tripoli on June 10, 1805, by which America agreed to pay a ransom of $60,000 to secure release of prisoners of war. Lear, George Washington’s former secretary, may have been one of the “gentlemen” acquainted “with Barbary affairs.” As Lear himself put it when negotiating with the Pasha, the U.S. would pay a one-time ransom “but not a cent for peace,” a perfect reflection of Jefferson’s ideal. Despite the new treaty, fighting with the Barbary States continued intermittently until Commodore Decatur’s decisive victory in 1815. Decatur captured two Algerian ships and forced the Dey of Algiers to submit to a new treaty. When he brought his nine-ship squadron to bay in Tunis and Tripoli later that year, he forced their leaders to submit to American demands, and ended the age-old Barbary practice of exacting tributes for safe passage through the Mediterranean. References:
Lambert, Frank. The Barbary Wars: American Independence in the Atlantic World (New York, 2005), 123-155.
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