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“We are without money… without provision and forage… without Cloathing; and … without Men. In a word, we have lived upon expedients till we can live no longer, and it may truly be said that, the history of this War is a history of false hopes….” “We must have a permanent force; not a force that is constantly fluctuating and sliding from under us as a pedestal of Ice would leave a Statue in a Summers day…. Our Civil government must likewise undergo a reform--ample powers must be lodged in Congress as the head of the Federal Union, adequate to all the purposes of War. Unless these things are done, our efforts will be in vain….” Summary:
Washington reports on the appointment of Nathanael Greene to replace Horatio Gates in command of the Southern Department of the Continental Army. Washington asks George Mason, a prominent Virginia politician, to lend whatever support he can to Greene, and gives a desperate report on the state of the army, and a brief argument in favor of expanding the powers of Congress to prosecute the war. After the disastrous Battle of Camden, South Carolina, Greene’s appointment – and his successful leadership – finally allowed Washington to regain the offensive. George Washington. Autograph Letter Signed to George Mason, October 22, 1780. 4 pp. Inventory# 21398 Price on Request
Complete Transcript: Hd. Qrs. Passaic Falls, Oct. 22d, 1780.
Dear Sir:
In consequence of a resolve of Congress directing an enquiry into the conduct of Majr Genl. Gates - & authorising me to appoint some other Officer in his place, during this enquiry, I have made choice of Majr. Genl. Greene who will, I expect, have the honor of presenting you with this Letter. -
I shall without scruple introduce this Gentn. to you as a man of abilities – bravery, & coolness – He has a comprehensive knowledge of our affairs, and is a man of fortitude and resources – I have not the smallest doubt therefore, of his employing all the means which may be put into his hands to the best advantage – nor of his assisting in pointing out the most likely [2] ones to answer the purposes of his command – With this character, I take the liberty of recommending him to your civilities & support; for I have no doubt, from the embarrassed situation of Southern affairs – of his standing much in need of the latter from every Gentn. of Influence in the assemblies of those States.
As Genl. Greene can give you the most perfect information – in detail – of our present distresses, and future prospects, I shall content myself with giving the agregate acct. of them, - and with respect to the first, they are so great and complicated, that it is scarcely within the powers of description to give an adequate idea of them – with regard to the second, unless there is a material change both in our civil and military policy, it will be in vain to contend much longer.
We are without money - & have been so for a long tim e- without Provision & forage, except what is taken by Impress – without Cloathing – and shortly shall be [3] (in a manner) without men – In a word, we have lived upon expedients till we can live no longer, and it may truly be said that the history of this war is a history of false hopes, & temporary devices, instead of System - & oeconomy which results from it.
If we mean to continue our struggles (& it is to be hoped we shall not relinquish our claims) we must do it upon an entire new plan – We must have a permanent force – not a force that is constantly fluctuating, & sliding from under us as a pedestal of Ice would leave a Statue in a summers day – Involving us in expence that baffles all calculation – an expence which no funds are equal to – We must at the same time contrive ways & means to aid our taxes by loans, & put our finance upon a more certain & stable footing than they are at present – Our Civil government must likewise undergo a reform – ample powers must be lodged in Congress as the head of the federal union, adequate to all the purposes [4] of War. - Unless these things are done, our efforts will be in vain & only serve to accumulate expence – add to our perplexities, & dissatisfy the people without a prospect of obtaining the prize in view – But these Sentiments do not appear well in a hasty letter – without digestion or order – I have not time to give them otherwise -- & shall only assure you that they are well meant however crude they may appear – With sincere affection,
I am Dr Sir / Yr. most obedt. Servt.
Go: Washingt[on]
George Mason Esqr
[docket:] 22 Octr 1780 / to Geo. Mason
[in another hand:] Gen Greene / appointment / to the South Historical Background:
By the autumn of 1780, George Washington had observed a series of calamities, from the fall of Charleston (May 12, 1780) and the humiliating defeat of Horatio Gates’s southern army at Camden (August 16, 1780), to his own desolate camp in Morristown, New Jersey over the brutal winter of 1779-1780. He had also seen a trusted subordinate, Benedict Arnold, nearly succeed in turning over the keys to West Point to the British. Washington and others had supported Arnold in his previous grievances against Congress; his treachery, discovered just four weeks prior to this letter, symbolized a general feeling of anxiety that Americans did not have the moral fiber to succeed in their revolution. Washington felt Nathanael Greene was the perfect man to reverse the series of disasters that had befallen the American cause in the South, and hoped the recipient of this letter, George Mason, and other southern statesmen, would do all they could to help. Greene went on to wage one of the most impressive campaigns of the war. His successes in the South helped make possible Washington’s climactic triumph at Yorktown in October, 1781. Washington, Congress, and the Political Situation The defeat of Horatio Gates marked the decline of the anti-Washington faction in Congress. Washington’s supporters used the opportunity to replace Gates with Greene, who shared his commander’s views on the causes of the crises in supply and manpower faced by the Continental Army and had been at times outspoken in his criticisms of Congress while serving as Quartermaster General. Congress allowed Washington himself to nominate Greene, a departure from custom. Early in the war, Washington was reluctant to express opinions on political questions. Years of opposition to Parliamentary taxes and British soldiers had left most Americans wary of centralized control and standing armies. While deferring to Congress, in response to deficiencies in supplies of men, food, and materièl, Washington initiated the practice of writing circular letters to the states requesting supplies and new enlistees. When this was not enough, Washington asked and received temporary extraordinary powers (interpreted by some as dictatorial) to keep his army in the field in early 1777. After the Valley Forge winter (1777-1778), Washington grew more aggressive, reluctantly using and delegating the power of impressing supplies directly from farmers and merchants. He blamed the state governments, localist congressmen, and a general decline in virtue among Americans, for failing to meet the challenges of the war. The series of setbacks faced by the Continental Army in 1780 led Washington to his most forceful appraisal of America’s political weaknesses as the foundation of America’s failure to achieve ultimate military victory. Washington warned Mason about the consequences of the repeated failures of the Continental Congress and the states to keep his army well-supplied and adequately manned. He simply could not keep a respectable army in the field with a force of manpower “that is constantly fluctuating and sliding from under us as a pedestal of Ice would leave a Statue in a Summers day.” Washington struggled with the army's shortages every year of the war; “each autumn found him threatened with the calamities his men barely had survived the previous winter” (Freeman, 5:228). Procuring supplies became more and more difficult with the continual devaluation of American paper currency. In fact, after encamping at New Windsor, New York, Washington informed Congress that he was “holding his men together solely by the impressment of flour in New York State.” (Freeman, 5:232) Also in 1780, Washington had hoped to cooperate with the newly arrived French army under General Rochambeau in an offensive operation against New York. However, his requests for new levies were met with indifference by the states, allowing him, to barely meet the requirements for defensive warfare against General Henry Clinton’s army in New York. Washington and several other officers, such as Greene, Alexander Hamilton, and Philip Schuyler, who saw the sufferings of the soldiers at Valley Forge in 1777 and Morristown in 1780, would constitute an emerging bloc of nationalists. Hamilton, for example, wanted to consolidate sovereignty in Congress at the expense of the states, and establish a permanent revenue base. Serving as aide-de-camp to Washington for four years during the Revolution, Hamilton formed a bond with his commander-in-chief that was, as historian Ron Chernow writes, “based less on personal intimacy than on shared experiences of danger and despair and common hopes for America’s future…. they had drawn the same conclusions: the need for a national army, for centralized power over the states, for a strong executive, and for national unity” (153). At this time, many state leaders were finally appreciating the grave necessity for interstate cooperation in raising troops and supplying the Continental Army. They were also beginning to understand that Congress and Washington needed to have real power to enforce Congressional requisition orders in order to force delinquent states into compliance. On November 8, 1780, delegates appointed by the state assemblies of New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, Connecticut and New York met in Hartford, Connecticut, to discuss the difficulties of raising and supplying the Continental Army. Each of the state delegations at Hartford resolved to instruct their respective Congressmen to support enlistments for the Continental Army “for three years or during the War. . . . and to give an additional bounty to such as shall Inlist for the latter Period” (memory.loc.gov, 4:568). The delegates also explicitly recognized the delinquency of many of the states. The delegates went so far as to “earnestly” recommend that the states: …use their influence in Congress That the Commander in Chief of the Army of the United States be Authorized and Impowered to take such Measures as he may deem proper and the public Service may render necessary to Induce the several States to a punctual compliance with the Requisitions which have been or may be made by Congress for Supplies for the Years 1780 and 1781 (memory.loc.gov, 4:573). The Hartford Convention was an indication of the change in official opinion, at least in the North, toward unifying the states and binding state officials to the orders of Congress. This movement resulted in the implementation of the Articles of Confederation, which were agreed to by Congress in 1777, but not in force until ratified by Maryland on March 1, 1781. Finally the United States could operate on a “constitutional foundation,” as historian Joseph Ellis argues (131). Congress was empowered to create departments of finance, war and foreign affairs. Talented individuals such as Robert Morris (Secretary of Finance) emerged to bring more dynamic superintendence of the war effort. In time, even the Articles of Confederation proved insufficient to ensure American fiscal stability and security from foreign and frontier threats. Washington, first as commander-in-chief and then as a retired planter at home in Virginia, communicated with nationalists in Congress and in the legislatures of Virginia and the states. The Annapolis Convention of 1786, chaired by Washington, was a decisive moment in the drive for a new convention to bring about political reforms. A year later, the Constitutional Convention met in Philadelphia, finally resolving questions that had their origins in the great military crises of the Revolution. This message was so important to Washington that he also sent letters expressing the same sentiments to Archibald Cary, Benjamin Harrison, Edmund Pendleton, and Bartholemew Dandridge (per Fitzpatrick). Washington, Gates, Greene, and the Southern Military Situation Horatio Gates (1726-1806), long seen by critics of Washington as a potential replacement, was sent to the South early in 1780. On August 16, 1780, the armies of Gates and British General Charles Cornwallis met at Camden. Gates relied too heavily on militia for an open-field engagement against British artillery and bayonets: his Maryland, Carolina and Virginia militia were the first to break. Gates personally fled the battlefield and did not stop until he was 180 miles away. Though a force of Continentals under Baron Johann de Kalb stubbornly held their ground for several hours more, Cornwallis convincingly defeated Gates’s entire force, killing nine hundred Americans and taking nearly a thousand prisoners. Nathanael Greene (1742-1786) was one of Washington’s most trusted lieutenants. He was born a Quaker but entered the military in 1774 as a private in a Rhode Island militia company. In 1775 he was commissioned a brigadier in the Continental service. Active during the siege of Boston, he subsequently commanded the army of occupation. After weathering criticism during the battle of Long Island, Greene ably led a column at Trenton and extricated his soldiers from the defeat at Brandywine. In March of 1778, at Washington’s request, Greene reluctantly took on the arduous job of Quartermaster General for the Continental Army. He created an orderly supply system, and ensured the army’s mobility. In 1780, after Gates was relieved of command, Greene brilliantly took charge of the southern army. His strategy was to retreat when confronted by greater force, but to surprise small British and Loyalist units. He fought one large-scale battle, holding his own against Cornwallis’s entire army in the Battle of Guilford Courthouse in March, 1781. Greene’s campaign culminated in the defeat of British Lt. Col. Alexander Stewart’s army at Eutaw Springs, and the re-conquest of most of North and South Carolina. Cornwallis, sorely in need of supplies, led his army to the Virginia coast. Thus, Greene’s southern campaign helped make possible Washington’s triumph at Yorktown later in 1781. After the surrender of Cornwallis, Greene continued to pursue and defeat the remaining British and Loyalist forces in the south. Greene was hailed as a hero at the close of the war, but was plagued by both debt and accusations of profiteering as quartermaster general. The charges would be proven false, but it would take Congress a decade after Greene’s 1786 death to finally liquidate his military-incurred debts. George Mason (1725-1792) was a wealthy, well-respected Virginia planter and revolutionary-era statesman. A defender of republican principles, Mason authored the 1774 Fairfax Resolves, advocating non-importation and the calling of a continental congress as responses to Parliament’s Coercive Acts. He also was the leading draftsman of the 1776 Virginia Declaration of Rights. Mason was appointed to the First Continental Congress in 1774 but declined to serve. He represented Fairfax County in the state legislature from 1777 through 1781. Mason was an active member of the 1787 Constitutional Convention. Objecting to a number of its final provisions, including its lack of a Bill of Rights, he refused to sign. With Patrick Henry, Mason led the fight against ratification by Virginia. Though Virginia did ratify, Mason’s principled objections helped generate momentum for a Bill of Rights in the form of amendments to the Constitution. George Washington (1732-1799) Commander-in-Chief of the Continental Army during the American Revolution, President of the Constitutional Convention, first president of the United States (1789-1797). Washington’s military victories, deference to politicians while at the head of his army, and sound leadership in establishing precedents, executive departments, and guidelines for foreign policy while President, made him the indispensable founding father. Condition: Very fine, but for loss of final two letters of Washington’s signature, caused by the original opening of the letter’s wax seal. They have been “restored” (penned in) by the chief conservator of the Folger Shakespeare Library. References:
Carp, E. Wayne. “To Starve the Army at Pleasure”: Continental Army Administration and American Political Culture, 1775-1783. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1984. Ellis, Joseph. His Excellency: George Washington. London and New York: Faber & Faber, 2004. Freeman, Douglas S. George Washington, a Biography. 7 vols. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1948-1957. Hoffman, Ronald. “The ‘Disaffected’ in the Revolutionary South,” in Alfred Young, ed., The American Revolution. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1976, pp. 273-316.
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