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“Assuming that we have 50,000 men and the enemy nearly twice that number, protected by intrenchments, I am clearly of the opinion that no attack should be made. Our forces are inferior, and the battle of Shiloh proves that with only the advantage of position it was hazardous to contend against his superior strength, and to attack him in his intrenchments now, would probably inflict on us and the Confederacy a fatal blow… [Hardee to Beauregard]” “…I fully concur in the views contained in your letter of the 25th inst. received last night and I had already commenced giving orders to my chiefs of staff departments for their execution. But everything that is done must be done under the plea of the intention ‘to take the offensive’ at the opportune moment. Every Commandant of Corps must get every thing ready to move at a moments notice… [Beauregard to Hardee]” Summary: Hardee argues that holding onto the railroad junction of Corinth, Mississippi would be a tactical and strategic mistake. Not only would the South suffer serious losses, a decisive defeat at Corinth would tarnish the reputation of the Confederacy’s military capabilities, hurting hopes of foreign intervention and demoralizing the homefront. Hardee perceptively identifies the difficulties the Union Army would face in trying to occupy the interior of the Deep South, defending tenuous supply lines, “over a country where his mechanical superiority will not avail him.” Following Hardee’s “Views,” Beauregard pens two responses, agreeing with his advices and informing him that he was beginning preparations for an evacuation. Beauregard brilliantly evacuated his army from Corinth in the night of May 29-30, deceiving Union General Henry Halleck into thinking that Beauregard was massing troops for a general assault. William J. Hardee. Autograph Manuscript Signed, entitled “Views.” Corinth, Mississippi, May 25, 1862. Followed by: G.T. Beauregard. Draft or Retained Autograph Endorsement Signed, Corinth, May 26, 1862; and: G.T. Beauregard. Autograph Letter Signed, Corinth, May 26, 1862. 4 pp. in all. Inventory # 21779 $9,800 Complete Transcript:
[in Hardee’s hand:]
Views
The situation at Corinth requires that we should attack the enemy at once, or await his attack, or evacuate the place.
(annotation in Beauregard’s hand in the margin: A self evident proposition! G.T.B.)
Assuming that we have 50,000 men
(note in Beauregard’s hand: We had not over 45,000 effectives whereas the Enemy had about 125,000 men according to their own accounts. G.T.B.)
and the enemy nearly twice that number, protected by intrenchments, I am clearly of the opinion that no attack should be made. Our forces are inferior, and the battle of Shiloh proves that with only the advantage of position it was hazardous to contend against his superior strength, and to attack him in his intrenchments now, would probably inflict on us and the Confederacy a fatal blow. Neither the number, nor instruction of our troops renders them equal to the task.
I think we can successfully repel any attack upon our camp by the enemy; but it is manifest no attack is meditated, it will be approached gradually, and will be shelled and bombarded without equal means to respond. This will compel us to make sorties against his intrenched positions under most adverse circumstances or to evacuate the place. The latter seems to me inevitable. If so, the only remaining question is, whether the place should be evacuated before, or after, or during its defense.
After fire is opened, or the place is actively shelled or bombarded, or during such an attack, it will be difficult to evacuate the place in good order. With a large body of men imperfectly disciplined, any idle rumor may spread a pause and [2] inextricable confusion may follow, so that the retreat may become a rout. The same objections would apply to any partial or feeble defense of the place and an attempt to evacuate it in the meanwhile. If the defense be not determined or the battle decisive, no useful result would follow, but it would afford an opportunity to our enemies to magnify the facts, give them a pretext to claim a victory and to discourage our friends at home and abroad, and diminish, if not destroy, all chances of foreign intervention.
Under these circumstances I think the evacuation, if it be determined upon, should be made before the enemy opens fire, and not coupled with a sortie against his intrenchments or partial battle. It should be done promptly if at all. Even now the enemy can shell our camp. It should be done in good order so as not to discourage our friends or give a pretext for the triumph of our enemies.
With the forces at our disposition, with a vast territory behind us, with a patriotic & devoted people to support us, the enemy as he moves southward away from rivers and railroads, would find insurmountable obstacles in moving columns so heavy that we cannot strike them, and over a country where his mechanical superiority will not avail him.
If we resolve to evacuate, every hour of delay only serves to augment our difficulties. The enemy every day grows stronger on our flanks, and menaces more & more our communications If he effects his designs, we must fight at every dis- [3] advantage or retreat disastrously. History & our country will judge us not by the movement, but its consequences.
Respflly submitted,
W J Hardee.
Major Genl
Genl G.T. Beauregard.
Comdg &c:
[docket in unknown hand:] Corinth. May 25 1862 / Genl W. Hardee / views, / relative to evacuation / of / Corinth - [in Beauregard’s hand:]
Corinth – Miss – May 26th 1862
I concur fully in the above views & already all needful preparations are being made for a proper & prompt evacuation of this place.
G.T. Beauregard
Gnl. Comdg
Corinth Miss May 26th 1862
Dear General
I fully concur in the views contained in your letter of the 25th inst. received last night and I had already commenced giving orders to my chiefs of staff departments for their execution. But everything that is done must be done under the plea of the intention ‘to take the offensive’ at the opportune moment. Every Commandant of Corps must get every thing ready to move at a moments notice and must see to the proper condition of the roads and bridges his Corps is to travel upon.
Thanking you for your kind wishes,
I remain
Yours Truly:
G.T. Beauregard
Major Genl W.J. Hardee
Near Corinth/Miss [docket possibly in Beauregard’s hand:] Corinth. Miss. / May 25th / 1862 / Major Genl W.J. Hardee / To / Genl G.T. Beauregard / Relative to the / evacuation of / the fortified position / of Corinth. / Corinth. Miss. / May 25: 1862 [in unknown hand:] one enclosure / to be copied Historical Background:
Beauregard took command of the Department of the West after Albert S. Johnston was killed in the first day’s combat at the Battle of Shiloh on April 6, 1862. Beauregard, swept from the field by Ulysses S. Grant on April 7, retreated thirty miles south to Corinth, a strategically important town in northern Mississippi at the intersection of the Memphis & Charleston and Mobile & Ohio Rail Roads. Henry W. Halleck, recently promoted to overall Union command in the West, came all the way from St. Louis to assume command of the unified armies of Don Carlos Buell, Ulysses Grant, and John Pope. Grant’s costly victory at Shiloh had made Halleck very anxious about his judgment and preparedness, and he now sought to keep a closer eye on his chief subordinate. By May 1, Halleck had over 100,000 men, and commenced a southward movement toward Corinth. On May 26, the date of Beauregard’s endorsement and letter, William T. Sherman, commanding the right wing of Halleck’s giant army, wrote to his wife, “None of us now doubt but that the entire southern army is face to face with us and full of courage & confidence. Our men are also equally full of Confidence and the chances are of one of the most desperate battles of history.” In the meantime, Beauregard was reinforced by Earl Van Dorn’s Army of the West on May 3. As Halleck moved ponderously southward, Beauregard threw out skirmishers to slow his advance, and Halleck stopped each night to create new entrenchments. Though Halleck still had double Beauregard’s manpower, he resolved to commence siege operations rather than confront Beauregard in open field combat. On May 25, Beauregard held a war council. Corps commanders Hardee, Polk, and Bragg decided that the evacuation of Corinth “had now become imperative,” as Beauregard later recalled.
Beauregard delayed Halleck's forces for a few more days, and then executed a nighttime evacuation on May 29-30. Beauregard saved his army by a hoax. Some of the men were given three days’ rations and ordered to prepare for an attack. As expected, one or two deserters went over to the Union army with that news. Beauregard utilized the Mobile and Ohio Rail Road to carry the sick and wounded, the heavy artillery, and tons of supplies. When a train arrived, the troops cheered as though reinforcements were arriving. They set up “Quaker guns” along the defensive earthworks. Camp fires were kept burning, and buglers and drummers played. The rest of the men slipped away undetected. When Union patrols entered Corinth on the morning of May 30, they found the Confederates gone. Most historians believe that the Union seizure of the strategic railroad crossover at Corinth led directly to the fall of Fort Pillow on the Mississippi, the surrender of Memphis, and the opening of the Mississippi River to Federal gunboats as far south as Vicksburg. Still, Beauregard slipped away unscathed, and though he would take unauthorized sick leave in June, ceding command to Braxton Bragg and escalating his feud with President Jefferson Davis, the Confederates would mount a surprising offensive in the late summer of 1862. In the present manuscript, there are two annotations written by Beauregard, the first in pencil, likely written at the time, the second in blue pencil likely written after the war. Hardee’s Views and Beauregard’s endorsement and letter are all published in Beauregard’s memoir, ghostwritten by aide Alfred Roman in 1884 as Military Operations of General Beauregard. The memoir is very thorough, and Beauregard would have found these documents useful in defending his decision to withdraw in the face of Halleck’s superior army in May 1862. The documented support of his respected corps commander confirms Beauregard’s good judgment. It is our present opinion that this collective document was retained by Beauregard and reproduced in his memoir. Beauregard’s second annotation, “We had not over 45,000 effectives whereas the Enemy had about 125,000 men according to their own accounts,” adopts the past tense and utilizes “accounts” that would only become available after the war. P.G.T. Beauregard (1818-1893) was the first prominent Confederate general, commanding the defenses of Charleston, South Carolina, in 1861. His actions in reducing Fort Sumter were the opening volleys of the Civil War. Beauregard was a native of Louisiana who was an engineer on Winfield Scott’s staff during the Mexican War after graduating second in the West Point class of 1838. Beauregard was commissioned a full general early in the war and played significant roles at First Bull Run, Shiloh, the defense of Charleston in 1863, and the defense of Richmond, Virginia, in 1864. His influence over Confederate strategy was hurt by his deteriorating relationship with President Davis. William J. Hardee (1815-1873) of Georgia published Hardee’s Tactics, the best-known drill manual of the era. Hardee was appointed brigadier general in the Confederate Army in June 1861, earned promotion to major general in October, and commanded a corps under Albert S. Johnston in Tennessee. After the Battle of Shiloh, Hardee was promoted to lieutenant general. He served as corps commander in the Army of Tennessee for most of the rest of the war, and was known as a reliable but not brilliant officer. References: David Eicher, The Longest Night: A Military History of the Civil War (New York, 2001), pp. 243-251; Alfred Roman, Military Operations of General Beauregard (1884), Vol. 1, pp. 381-91, 576-584; Brooks D. Simpson and Jean V. Berlin. Sherman’s Civil War: Selected Correspondence of William T. Sherman, 1860-1865 (Chapel Hill, 1999), pp. 226-228.
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